


America VS. Micronesia

Containing portions of
the U.S. government's

CLASSIFIED

Solomon Report: A
blueprint for colonialism.



FRIENDS OF MICRONESIA

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This pamphlet is composed of excerpts from two recently published articles and from the classified portion of a government report.

I. A COLONIAL BIOGRAPHY¹

MICRONESIA'S KALEIDOSCOPIC colonial history began in the 1880s when Spain solidified her hold on the three great island chains of the Marianas, Carolines and Marshalls and their disparate peoples. After the War of 1898, America seized Guam and incorporated it as a full U.S. territory, and Germany bought up the remaining islands in their best Teuton manner until 1914 when, to the mystification of the native islanders, another distant war brought another colonial master, this time the Japanese. The League of Nations awarded Micronesia as a mandate to Japan, which set about colonizing and exploiting the islands on a large scale. But ignoring the prohibitions of the Mandate Agreement, Japan fortified her colony and used Micronesian bases to launch attacks throughout the Pacific. True to the historic pattern, the new war brought a new ruler to Micronesia. It also brought death and devastation to the islands, as the United States wrested Japan's mandate from her in vicious campaigns that gave America a brand new set of obscure battleplaces: Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Saipan, Truk and Peleliu.

Since American wartime assurances claimed we sought no territorial gain, Truman's men haggled tirelessly at the United Nations in 1947 to ratify American control and proclaim Micronesia a Trust Territory under U.S. administrative authority. But ours was a unique arrangement: ever conscious of Micronesia's strategic location, the U.S. pressured the UN into declaring the islands a "strategic trust" in which we could build any military installations necessary for "the maintenance of international peace and security." The UN established ten other trust territories, but none were "strategic trusts." Further, while each of the other administering nations ultimately was responsible to the UN General Assembly, the U.S. answered only to the Security Council, where we conveniently can veto any policy we oppose. Blithely America accepted the UN's charge to promote the political development of the people toward "self-government or independence" and to advance their social, economic and educational well-being.

1) From "The Americanization of Micronesia: Paradise Lost," by Steve Murray (Ramparts, Feb., 1971). Murray was a PCV in Palau District from 1966-68 and a student in International Relations at Tufts University. He has worked closely with Friends of Micronesia.


IT TOOK ONLY FIVE MONTHS after the signing of the Trusteeship Agreement for the U.S. to get down to business. The taste of Hiroshima still hot on its lips, the military had to find a place to start its bomb tests. They chose a tiny atoll called Eniwetok in the Marshall Islands, and immediately the entire population was rounded up and removed. Without legal counsel and given no choice in the matter, the Eniwetokians signed a contract of consent which never was translated into their own language. They were sent to an isolated, rat-infested island with resources so meager that the people were plunged into mass malnutrition, cut off from their homeland and devoid of vital governmental services. The people of Bikini got the same kind of treatment before an H-bomb leveled their island. To compensate, the U.S. invested a total of \$450,000 in U.S. government securities, generously doling out the interest to the uprooted Marshallese.

However, the seed of early American policy in Micronesia grew on Kwajalein island and the nearby islet of Ebeye where the U.S. built a guided missile test center. The chance to earn a cash wage drew hundreds of Marshallese from neighboring islands. Eventually the military built a ghetto for the laborers and their families on Ebeye, a scrap of land one-tenth of a mile square, three miles away. When the Army expanded the Nike missile program to include interception of ICBMs fired from California, it stacked the slums a little higher with island populations that had to be moved from the path of falling debris. By the late 1960s, 3800 people competed for living space on Ebeye. Startled in their innocence, the military disclaims any responsibility for conditions on Ebeye—it's just the old story of supply and demand.

What has the U.S. supplied to these two islands? A typical child on Ebeye lives in a shantytown, faces endless epidemics, receives occasional education and health care, and exists irremediably cut off from his ancestral life style and independence. His father working on Kwajalein deals with an additional gift of American import: Jim Crow. There American personnel live in a neat, air-conditioned community that combines Leisure World with Brave New World. Americans shop at a PX and buy fresh lettuce flown in from Hawaii; they ride in taxis for free, bowl for free, go deep-sea fishing for free. The finest of educational and health facilities are theirs, and they make fat salaries, augmented by allowances to soften the strain of living in a hardship location. Micronesians on the base work mostly as domestics. They commute from Ebeye. Until just recently they could neither ride in taxis nor buy anything in the stores. Kwajalein even closed its modern hospital to Ebeye residents three miles away, so that a seriously ill Marshallese would have to be flown 1500 miles to Guam for treatment.


Most of the remaining Micronesians have escaped the military depredations that befell their brethren in the Marshalls. In 1951 the Navy relinquished control of the Trust Territory





to the Interior Department, chiefly because Interior showed it could administer the islands for no more than the \$5-7 million a year spent by the Navy. For the next decade this miserly annual appropriation had to provide for all governmental operations and services in the Trust Territory, including health, education, transportation, economic development and all governmental salaries. Almost complete stagnation followed throughout the islands, and the Micronesians were frustrated in every effort to participate in the modern world. They had no control of their affairs. All power rested with an American High Commissioner, who took his cues from Washington. Below him in each of the six administrative districts—the Marshalls, Marianas, Ponape, Truk, Yap and Palau—an American District Administrator ruled his own fief, responsible only to the High Commissioner. Unwilling to help Micronesia herself, the U.S. effectively sealed off the islands from outside influences by prohibiting almost any investment or visitors. Nor could many Micronesians get out: with no capital, economic opportunities were nil, and since the Trust Territory had only two high schools, few people had any chance for advanced education.

One notable exception stands out on Saipan, in the Marianas. The CIA gave the Saipanese their chance to contribute to "international peace and security" by transforming one-half of their island into a super-secret training base for Chinese Nationalists who planned assaults on mainland China. For the entire 13 years of the project's existence, the Saipanese were denied access to the half of their island utilized by the Americans and Chinese. Probably because of the dual proddings of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the expense of the Saipan scheme (\$28 million), the CIA abandoned its complex and returned it to the Trust Territory government, which moved its headquarters there in 1962.



Finally, in the early 1960s, American policy altered somewhat. First came budget increases—to a munificent \$17.5 million. Then the government began the first significant development of Micronesian resources since Japanese days: it allowed Van Camp to establish a tuna-fishing operation. A crash program whisked several hundred Peace Corps volunteers into the islands just ahead of the 1967 UN visiting mission, which nodded approvingly at the volunteers' earnestness. Yet nothing compared in importance to the formation of Micronesia's first Territory-wide legislature, the Congress of Micronesia. Patterned after the U.S. federal legislature, it comprises a Senate (two members from each of the six districts), and a House of Representatives apportioned by population. With its first session in 1965, Micronesians at last had a voice in their government. Seeking to muffle that voice, the U.S. gave the High Commissioner and Secretary of the Interior final veto powers over legislation passed by the Micronesian Congress and kept all budget matters in executive hands (doubtless recalling how American colonial legislatures used the power of the purse to throttle recalci-

trant governors). Nonetheless, the U.S. had taken a fatal step, for the legislature quickly earned the allegiance of the Micronesian people and greatly fostered the sense of Micronesian unity among the disparate island cultures. This unity came not a moment too soon, for by the end of the 1960s Micronesia faced a renewed threat to her aspirations for self-determination as the U.S. unfolded her design for carrying the Pax Americana to the Pacific Rim.

WASHINGTON KNOWS AS WELL as corporate businessmen about the Asia story: that U.S. trade with Asia reached \$12.9 billion in 1967, and that earnings on investments in Asia far outstrip those from Latin America or Europe. The Pacific Rim fascinates U.S. business, both for its current wealth (Japan ranks as our second largest trading partner) and for the much-heralded potential of Indonesia and other Southeast Asian nations—so much so that "the opening up of Asia" has already become a cliché for the 1970s. America has been in there fighting for military dictatorships in South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, in addition to South Vietnam, to assure other nations they have a friend in Uncle Sam should internal dissension threaten the status quo. Billions of dollars of foreign aid prop up cooperative countries. Empires like ours are not maintained by treaties and friendly persuasion alone; thus, by late 1969, U.S. economic, political and military interests required her to keep 833,000 troops and 195 major military installations in Asia.


Nixonian Washington found itself in a terrible bind, however. Vietnam demonstrated that U.S. ground troops cannot defeat strong guerrilla forces. And besides, the mothers in Peoria weren't going to stand to have more of their sons slaughtered in the jungles. To solve the double bind, new American strategy calls for the U.S. to use its great air power and logistics capabilities to support Asian ground troops doing the kind of fighting at which U.S. troops failed in Vietnam. It amounts to Vietnamization on a continental scale. The strategy requires a vast array of forward and rear bases in the Pacific, since strategists insist on both speedy and massive responses by American forces. With the largest existing U.S. base in Asia—Okinawa—gone by 1972, and all other American installations based in possibly unstable sovereign allies, the Pentagon boys dusted off their old Pacific charts where America ruled "virtually as if it were an area over which we had sovereignty"—in the words of former Undersecretary of State Katzenbach. So Micronesia came to be the launching pad of law and order in the Pacific.

The military men though they had an easy catch in Micronesia. And why not? The Trust Territory government claims over 50 per cent of all Micronesian land as public domain under sole control of the High Commissioner. Large areas still remained designated as "military retention land" after the U.S. folded up World War II bases, and a year ago, to



build good will, the Navy even sent Seabee teams to work on public projects in Micronesia. The U.S. Congress did its part by pumping \$40 million into the Trust Territory's budget, as if to demonstrate the potential generosity of the civilian branch.

The Palau district, however, cast a wary eye upon General Lewis Walt, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, when he visited the islands last year. Walt, an arch foe of "yapping peaceniks" (he claimed last fall that peace demonstrations had prevented an American victory in Vietnam), came to Palau, hoping for a site on which to build a Marine jungle training base. He told the District Legislature that their islands were ideal and he hoped they could work out an agreement for land use. Oblivious to the Micronesian custom that forbids face-to-face refusal of a request, he left Palau with a feather in his cap, believing he had the acquiescence of the Legislature. Instead, the legislators gave him a black eye: as soon as he left they passed a resolution stating that the proposed base "would not be in the best interests of the Palauan people" who are "a peace-loving people who have no desire ever again to have the tragedies of war visited upon them." Walt, sure that a Peace Corps lawyer had put the lawmakers up to this treachery, got the White House to quickly curtail Micronesia's Peace Corps lawyer program.



Peleliu Invasion Beach

II. NEGOTIATIONS AND THE UN²

Since February, 1968, only two territories, Micronesia and Australian New Guinea, have remained under trusteeship. Every other U.N. trust territory created after World War II has proceeded to independence, either in its own right or by integration with a contiguous sovereign state. The last of the trusts to become independent was Nauru, the tiny but rich phosphate island in the western Pacific. From Nauru, waves of nationalist self-assertion began to surge belatedly across the Pacific. Tonga and Fiji, two inward-looking British dependencies, sought and achieved independence in 1970. Micronesians are not deaf to the new breakers that beat about their tropical shores.

In late September, 1969, a Micronesian Political Status Delegation came to Washington to conduct preliminary negotiations with representatives of the U.S. government. The delegation had been elected by the Congress of Micronesia. It was mandated to identify and explore questions that would arise if Micronesia chose free association or independence. The United States negotiators consisted of officials from the Interior, State and Defense Departments, along with observers from the Interior and Insular Affairs Committees of Congress.

Two central areas of disagreement emerged from these discussions. First, while the Micronesians wanted full control of land in Micronesia, the Americans insisted that ultimate control must rest with the president of the United States. Second, the Micro-

nesians viewed the status of free association as a compact revocable by either party, but the Americans contemplated it as a permanent constitutional link.

The next move came in January, 1970. America, at last, took the initiative and presented the Micronesians with a draft of a bill under which Micronesia would become an unincorporated territory of the United States, like Guam or the Virgin Islands. The Micronesians flatly rejected the idea.

In March the Visiting Mission of the U.N. Trusteeship Council made its triennial tour of Micronesia. The mission held a short discussion with the Micronesian Political Status Delegation, expressed cautious sympathy with its general aspirations, and left. In its report to the Trusteeship Council, the mission's comments on the road to self-determination were so guarded that they were almost opaque. This was unfortunate; the mission could well have stated explicitly that the annexation of a trust territory by the trustee would be incompatible with the spirit of the U.N. Charter and the trusteeship agreement. It must be mentioned that the Trusteeship Council is composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, France (which has no intention of relinquishing its hold over its own Pacific territories), Australia, Nationalist China and the Soviet Union, and that no Soviet representative has yet been elected a member of a visiting

2) From "Micronesia's Dilemma: US Strategy vs. Self-Determination," by Stanley deSmith, (War/Peace Report, Jan., 1971). DeSmith served as constitutional advisor to the British government during the decolonization of Mauritius and Fiji, and is a professor at Cambridge University.

3) Australia has since agreed to a definite timetable for New Guinea's independence.

mission. In no conceivable sense is the Trusteeship Council a microcosm of the U.N.

Negotiations with American representatives were resumed in May, this time in Micronesia. After a brief but thorough exchange of viewpoints, the talks ended in a deadlock—a deadlock that has yet to be broken.

For most Micronesian politicians, free association represented a hard-headed sacrifice of an emotional preference for independence. Under free association they would continue to accept an American military presence, but at a negotiated price; and if things went wrong, they could still take the ultimate risk of opting out of the compact and proceeding to independence. But for the Americans, this was not good enough. Independence for Micronesia, they made clear, was not the status at which their activity in the territory was being directed. A status which included an independence option was little better: Commonwealth status would adequately protect American interests because 1) it would be permanent and 2) the president would retain paramount authority to acquire any Micronesian land for America's purposes.

The second implication of commonwealth status was especially distasteful to the Micronesians. They wanted to renegotiate the price for America's existing defense facilities as well as strike their own bargains in the future. And they felt a close attachment to their scarce and precious asset, their land.

In a struggle with American power, Micronesian politicians labor under grave handicaps. Their country is massively dependent on American largess and good will. No territory-wide nationalist party has yet established itself. Among the general populace, local separatism may still be a

stronger force than Micronesian nationalism. Few American officials will be alarmed by the passage in the Political Status Delegation's report hinting at a unilateral declaration of independence by a frustrated people.

Another complicating factor is the position of the Micronesian Congress vis-à-vis the American high commissioner, who is appointed by Washington and has veto power over the legislative body. As a result, the Congress is effectively separated from the executive branch of government and plays no real part in the formation of territorial policy. Even though the Congress of Micronesia has been increasingly militant—in spite of the



fact that members' salaries are now paid directly out of U.S. Congressional appropriations—the territorial politicians will fight a lonely, losing battle unless pressure is brought to bear on the U.S. government from outside Micronesia.

Enlightened opinion in the United States has yet to make itself effectively heard on the issue of Micronesia's status. One does not need to be a revolutionary to sympathize with the Micronesian attitude toward the right of self-determination, an attitude unusually moderate in a world of strident demands.

4) The first and only formal nationwide political party was recently organized by eleven of the thirty-three members of the Congress of Micronesia. The party's platform calls for complete independence.

III. A POLICY FOR IMPERIALISM: THE SOLOMON REPORT⁵

The following excerpts are taken from the classified portion of the Solomon Commission Report which was recently uncovered by The Micronesian Independence Advocates, a Micronesian group based in Hawaii. Although US officials claim that the Report does not represent policy, but is only one of many contingency plans, the independent observations of the authors of the proceeding articles, as well as those of many people who have been to Micronesia, undermine the credibility of this claim. The Report sets forth US policy, a policy which directly violates the United Nations Charter and the Micronesians' right of self-determination.

For a variety of reasons, in the almost twenty years of US control, physical facilities have further deteriorated in many areas, the economy has remained relatively dormant and in many ways retrogressed while progress toward social development has been slow. The people remain largely illiterate and inadequately prepared to participate in political commercial and other activities of more than a rudimentary character. The great majority depend largely upon subsistence agriculture--- fruit and nut gathering--- and fishing. As a result, criticism of the trusteeship has been growing in the UN and the US press--- and in certain ways, among the Micronesians.

2. Despite a lack of serious concern for the area until quite recently, Micronesia is said to be essential to the US for security reasons. We cannot give the area up, yet time is running out for the US in the sense that we may soon be the only nation left administering a trust territory. The time could come, and shortly, when the pressures in the UN for a settlement of the status of Micronesia could become more than embarrassing.

In recognition of the problem, the President, on April 18, 1962, approved NSAM No. 145 which set forth as US policy the movement of Micronesia into a permanent relationship with the US within our political framework. In keeping with that goal, the memorandum

5) This Report was commissioned by Pres. Kennedy in May, 1963. The Mission was headed by Prof. Anthony M. Solomon of Harvard Business School. Among the members of the Mission was a Peace Corps representative. The Report was submitted to the President on Oct. 9, 1963. (Underlining ours.)

called for accelerated development of the area to bring its political, economic and social standards into line with an eventual permanent association. The memorandum also established a task force to consider what action might be taken to accomplish our goal and to provide policy and program advice to the Secretary of the Interior who is responsible for the administration of the Trust Territory....

Major Objectives and Considerations

1. Working within its broad frame of reference, the Mission's major findings relate to three sets of questions that it attempted to answer:
 - a. What are the elements to consider in the preparation for, organization, timing and favorable outcome of a plebescite in Micronesia and how will this action affect the long-run problem that Micronesia, after affiliation, will pose for the US?
 - b. What should be the content and cost of the minimum capital investment and operating program needed to insure a favorable vote in the plebescite, and what should be the content and cost of the maximum program that could be effectively mounted to develop the Trust Territory most rapidly?
 - c. What actions need to be taken to improve the relationships between the current Trust Territory Government and Washington and to insure that it can implement any necessary political strategy and development program with reasonable efficiency and effectiveness?...
3. There are, however, unique elements in the delicate problem of Micronesia and the attainment of our objectives that urgently require the agreement now of the President and the Congress as to the guidelines for US action over the next few years. First, the US will be moving counter to the anti-colonial movement that has just about completed sweeping the world and will be breeching its own policy since World War I of not acquiring new territorial possessions if it seeks to make Micronesia a US territory. Second, of all eleven UN trusteeships, this will be the only one not to terminate in independence or merger with a contiguous country, but in a territorial affiliation with the administering power. Third, as the only "strategic trusteeship," the Security Council will have jurisdiction over the formal termination of the trusteeship agreement, and if such a termination is vetoed there, the US might have to decide to proceed

with a series of actions that would make the trusteeship agreement a dead issue, at least from the Micronesian viewpoint. Fourth, the 2,100 islands of Micronesia are, and will remain in the now foreseeable future, a deficit area to subsidized by the US. Fifth, granted that this subsidy can be justified as a "strategic rental," it will amount to more than \$300 annually per Micronesian through 1968 and any reductions thereafter will require long-range programming along the lines of a master development plan as proposed in the Mission report. Finally, this implementation of the political strategy and capital investment programs through fiscal year 1968 require a modern and more efficient concept of overseas territorial administration than is evident in the prevailing approach of the quasi-colonial bureaucracy in the present Trust Territory government.

Part I. Political Development of Micronesia

...7. Another factor of importance affecting the plebescite is the economic stagnation and deterioration of public facilities that has characterized the US administration of the Trust Territory in contrast to that of the Japanese....per capita Micronesian cash incomes were almost three times as high before the war as they are now and that the Micronesians freely used the Japanese-subsidized extensive public facilities. For the outcome of the plebescite to be favorable, the Mission believes there must be an effective capital investment program before the plebescite to give the Micronesians a sense of progress to replace the deadly feeling of economic dormancy....

14. The Mission recommends the following steps as part of the overall program to achieve our plebescite objective and at the same time promote the longer run political development and general advancement of the Micronesians:

- a. A qualified American should be appointed in each of the six districts to develop and maintain continuous liaison with the various leaders of the three politically critical groups. His main job would be to develop, in a gradual way, interest among these people in his district in favor of permanent affiliation by supplying the information needed to eliminate their ignorance and allay their fears as to what the affiliation would entail, as well as its advantages. He would also administer useful adult education and US and world information programs, as well as the local radio programming now handled by the

district director of education. These six information officers, in whose recruitment US Information Service should cooperate, would also perform through their supervisor at Headquarters the regular political reporting function so acutely lacking at present.

- b. Washington should facilitate the general development of Micronesian interest in, and loyalties to, the US by various actions, three of which are:
 - 1) Sponsorship by the Department of State of Micronesian leader visits to the US.
 - 2) Introduction in the school system of US oriented curriculum changes and patriotic rituals recommended in the selection of the Mission's Report dealing with education.
 - 3) Increasing the number of college scholarships offered to Micronesians, a highly sensitive issue in the TT.
- c. The Community Action Program by the 60 Peace Corps Volunteers recommended in the Mission report should be begun because it is of critical importance to both the plebescite attitudes and the overall advancement of the majority of Micronesians living on islands outside district centers. The program as recommended (which includes use of Peace Corps Volunteers as teachers in the school system) and the realities of Micronesian needs contain all the probabilities of a spectacular success for the Peace Corps.
- d. Preparations should be taken to offer Micronesian government employees and other wage earners two specific inducements to seek affiliation with the US. First, after such an affiliation Micronesian and US personnel basic pay scales would be equalized. Since the inequality exists only in the professional and higher administrative echelons, the cost would not be excessive. Second, rather than introduce a retirement program for Micronesian government employees, the Social Security system should be extended to all wage and salary earners in Micronesia (most of whom are government employees) with possible consideration of a more general inclusion simultaneously or at a later date....

art III. Administration in the Trust Territory...

- 9) The policy and administrative relationship between Washington, especially the Department of Interior, and the Trust Territory government must be sharply improved....the tradition of treating the Trust

Territory government somewhat as a sovereign foreign government...is in the Mission's opinion an unnecessary and inadvisable interpretation of the administering power's role in the Trust Territory.

IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The second round of negotiations between the US government and Micronesia took place quietly, with no positive results, in October, 1971 in Hawaii. Heading the US negotiating team, with a rank of ambassador, was Franklin Haydn Williams, former Asst. Secretary of Defense and President of the CIA-funded Asia Foundation. The negotiations were secretly directed from Washington by Henry Kissinger, Nixon's Security Advisor. Kissinger has been quoted as saying, "There are only 90,000 people out there. Who gives a damn?" In the past year, an increasing number of Peace Corps Volunteers have left the islands before completing their tour of service there, under direct pressure from the government's attempts to repress their views, or simply, in disgust at the Administration's policy there.

Aside from the formally organized pro-Independence Coalition in the Congress of Micronesia, there are at least two other Micronesian political groups: the Surviving Micronesian Club, P.O. Box 169, Agana, Guam 96910; and the Micronesian Independence Advocates, 2200 University Ave., Honolulu, Hawaii. Both groups are putting out monthly newsletters called the Surviving Micronesian and the Young Micronesian. (It was the Young Micronesian which first published classified portions of the Solomon Report.)

Active on the mainland is the Friends of Micronesia, a support group of Micronesians and Americans interested in making the American people aware of the Micronesians' struggle for self-determination. The group has produced and has available: a 16-min. multi-media show with slides, film, music, and narration depicting Micronesian history and America's role in it; a ½-inch videotape (B&W or color) of a 30-min. TV show which includes the above multi-media show plus a brief panel discussion; a bimonthly newsletter, this pamphlet, and various other materials (including FREE MICRONESIA buttons). It has also met with UN representatives. All of these groups need active support and contributions to continue.

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Population (1970)... approx. 102,000 (97 islands)
Total land area... 700 sqmi (2,141 islands)

